Import protection, export subsidies, and a potential common agricultural policy (CAP) system are all shown to be costly to Hungary in terms of lost welfare. The proposed CAP system would also significantly increase the government's fiscal problems.
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Morkre and Tarr quantitatively assess the as the long-run trend in Hungarian agricultural ccnsequences for Hungary of three types of policy has been toward less intervention and policies: more reliance on the market. A CAP system would significantly increase the government's -Removing quantitative import restraints in fiscal problems. agriculture, both for all of agricultire and for each of five separate agricultural products.
Import protection and export subsidies are costly, inefficient policies. The most important * Removing the export subsidy program in policy conclusion, they contend, has to do with agriculture.
the piecemeal sequencing of refonns in the presence of both export subsidies and import * Adopting a European Community-type licenses. Removing import l.eenses while export common agricultural policy (CAP) system in subsidies remain would generate byproduct Hungary.
distortions in the export market and little gain in welfare. The piecemeal removal of export The authors e; timate the consequences of all subsidies, however, would not generate policies by using a small open-economy computbyproduct distortion, so substantial gains could able general equilibrium model for Hungary, be expected -but at the expense of greater calibrated to the year 1990. adjustment costs.
They estimate the tariff equivalent of the To facilitate understanding of this commonly import licenses through a detailed study of price used type of general equilibrium model, they comparisons, the first of its kind for Hungary.
explain the results by using supply-and-demand graphs of the agricultural sector. Imposing a CAP system, they find, would be a costly step backward for Hungary, especially
INTRODUCTION
Hungary has made great strides in reca.nt years in moving toward a market oriented economy, including reforming its external trade regime. Although all imports were subject to an import licensing requirement as of December 1988, by 1992 tariff lines corresponding to over 75 percent of industrial output were liberalized, i.e., free of import licensing. However, certain problems remain.
Hungarian agricultural production remained fully protected through import licensing, and a significant share of the remaining industrial output protection was in the food sector, justified in part due to high cost agricultural output.
Moreover, agricultural export subsidies have become a large share of total government subsidies.
Since Hungary has signed an Association Agreement with the European Community (EC), some are sanguine regarding the f --of Hungary's trade pol.cy, taking the view that long-term harmonization of Hungary's trade policies with the EC will correct remaining distortions. But the most significant remaining protected sectors in Hungary are those sectors termed 'sensitive" by the EC,' in which polic4 . of the EC itself are quite distorted. Thus, it cannot be presumed that EC pressure will correct these distortions. Wor'e still, harmonization of Hungarian policies to those of the EC in the agricultural sector (a policy informall;' suggested by some policymakers in Hungary) would mean the introduction of a "Common Agriculture Policy" (CAP) type system and the continuation of export subsidies. Given that GDP originating in Hungarian agriculture is about 12 of total GDP, compared to 3 percent in the EC, a CAP type system in Hungary would be expected to impose a more significant deadweight loss burden on tne rest of the relatively fragile Huungarian economy.
In its international negotiations, the Government of Hungary has taken a progressive position on these issues. It is a member of the Cairn,; group in the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations, i.e. , it supports the reduction of agricultural s' bsidies and increased transparency of import barriers through tariffication, which includes the elimination of licenses on imported products. 2 Hungary justifies its interventionist policies in agriculture due to the fear of dumping on the part of the EC, and prefers a multilateral rather than unilateral reduction in these policies (see GATT, 1991) .3 In this paper we quantitatively assess che consequences of three categories of unilateral policy action by the Government of Hungary: (1) the costs to Hungary of its import restraints in agriculture, both in aggregate for all of agriculture and in each of five separate agricultural products: butter, pork, cheese, chicken and milk powder. The tariff equivalent of the import licenses was estimated through detailed empirical work based on price comparisons between the Hungarian and world markets; (2) the costs of ':he Hungarian export subsidy program; and (3) the costs of a CAP type system in Fungary. The consequences of all policies are estimated through the use of a small open economy computable general equilibrium model for Hungary, calibrated to the year 1990. we provide a thorough intuitive explanation of the results, however, through the use of partial equilibrium graphs of the agricultural sector (which itself is divided into three markets).
VWe show in the appendix, however, that agriculrural import licensing in Hungary is more extensive than in OECD countries outside of the EC 3 1t should be noted that tariffication of non-tariff barriers retains protection against dumping, cnd, since about 80 percent of Hungary's agricultural tariff lines are not bound under the GATr, tiriffication appears feasil.'e. Tariffication offers a number of advantages including: its transparancy will tend to reduce the dispersion in the protection regime as less protected interests become aware of the level of protection received by the highly protected sectors; and since licenses provide rents to those who obtain the licenses, licensing could generate costly rent-seeking which would be significantly reduced by tariffication.
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We find that import protection, export subsidies and a pot ,ntial CAP program are all costly to the country in terms of lost welfare, and the CAP system would contribute significantly to the Government's fiscal problems. We aiso find that the benefits of import liberalization are considerably muted in the presence of an export .subsidy program in the same industry, because, in response to the decrease in domestic demand, exporters substitute export sales (increasing the government's subsily burden). This indicates from a sequencing perspective, it is important to concurrently reduce export subsidies in the process of import liberalization.
Although the magnitude of the costs of protective and interver.tionist policies in the agriculture sector in East and Central Europe will surely vary across the different economies, similar policies and proposals have been discussed in other countries in East and Central Europe (since most now have Association Agreements with the EC) .' Thus, the information gained from this exercise should be relevant to the policies of some of these other East ane Central European countries as well.
In section 1I we briefly survey the recent referms in Hungarian agriculture policy as well as the principal remaining policy problems. In section III, the basic data of the model are presented. MGst notabil, this includes the details of a price comparisons study to determine the tariff equivalence of the import licensing regime. This price comparisons study is the first of its kind to our knowledge for Hungary, which is remarkable given the longstanding claim of the pre-1990 Government that the licenses do not represent a restraint to trade.'
An overview of the model is preserted in section III. The results are presented in sections IV and V. In section IV the results are interpreted through consumers' and producers' surplus using three ordinary supply-demand diagrams of 4 1n 1992 a CAP type system was being discussed in Poland and Czechoslovakia, and in Romania in 1993. 'See Haus (1992) for a fascinating account of the negotiations in the early 1970s under which Hungary entered the GATT. Hungary maintained that with the introduction of the 'New Econonmnic Mechansim," it had departed sufficiently from central planr.ing that the tariff was the principal import regualtory mechanism. The Hingarian representative steadfastly resisted quantitative imnport commitments characteristic of the accession agreements of Romania and Poland (due to their status as state trading countries), and insisted on (and received) tariff concessions as the 'price' of its admission to GATT. the agriculture sector. Despite the fact that they are partial equilibrium diagrams, since the linkages within the agriculturo' sector are incorporated, they are helpful for understanding the principal effects of the policy changes in general equilibrium models of this type. The equations of the model, as well as a comparison of the OECD countries import licensing regimes in agriculture are in the appendix.
II. RECENT POLICY CHANGES AFFECTING HUNGARIAN AGRICULTURE
The regulatory environment affecting Hungarian agriculture has changed dramatically in recent years. Thess changes include: removal of virtually all central controls on prices; reduction in government subsidies; unificatior; of current account transactions and elimination of state trading (following the demise of the CMEA trading system); and an opening of the types and numbers of firms that can engage in external trade, i.e., removal of the state monopoly of foreign trade.
Regulatorv Reform
Price Decontrol. Before 1989, 85 percent of the prices of Hungarian agricultural products were either set or regulated by the government. By January 1991, only consumer prices of white bread and one type of milk (2.9 percent milkfat) rr'nained reg'alated.
Subsidies. Overall subsidies to the agriculture sector (such as export, production, input and investment subsidies) fell from 3.7 percent to 1.6 percent of GDP between 1988 and 1990 (GATT, 1991 . Plans called for a further slash in production subsidies and a complete elimination of input subsidies. In fact, the reduction of production and input subsidies combined with the removal of price controls had an offsetting effect which left farm income relatively unchanged.6 Export subsidies, however, have not declined as significantly. For 6Tarr (1990, pp. 111-114) , using 1988 conditiors, estimates that similar results would have occurred in Poland for farmers producing butter. Tarr estimates that a policy of simultaneously lifting price controls and removing producer subsidies would have resulted in an improvement in producers' surplus of farmers. ' 2 There were some agricultural proJucts subject to licensing for which our price comparisons study did not show a positive licensing premium. We attribute this to the lack of adjustment for quality.
'3 For exampl, see Trela and Whalley (1990) and l'rela, Whally, and Wigle(i987) .
is typical of small open economy models, we aggregate all other countries into the "rest of the world" and treat this aggregate parametrically."4
The model assumes that market prices are sufficiently flexible to ensure that demands from utility maximizing consumers are consiste-t with the supplies of cost minimizing producers, resulting in market equilibrium. This assumption would be of doubtful validity in Hungarv prior to 1990, due to the widespread use of price controls for many products. In 1990, however, there was significant liberalization of prices as the ccuntry moved toward a market system, allowing us to reasonably employ a market clearing model. The supply side of the model assumes that the economy's total endowment of productive resources is fixed and employed in the two sectors. Although productive resources are not modelled explicitly, it is assur.jd that at least one input (e.g., labor) is mobile between the two sectors. The degree of flexibility between sectors is indicated by the elasticity of the constant elasticity of transformation (CETi production possibility frontier for the two sectors. In addition, each domestically produced product is a composite product that is a CET function of two specific varieties or qualities, one for the domestic market and the other for the export market. This specification captures the important product differentiation feature between exports and domestic products. For ' free lunch either provided to or received from the rest of the world in response to a policy shift. The real exchange rate adjusts to satisfy the constraint.
We measure the change in welfare by the Hicksian equivalent variation. The model is written and solved using the GAMS programming language; see Brooke et al.
(1988).

IV. COSTS OF LICENSING OF IMPORTS AND EXPORT SUBSIDIES
In table 3, we present the results of our examination of trade policy changes in particular agricultural sectors; the scenarios consider the impact of eliminating export subsidies, eliminating import licensing and eliminating both.
In the top part of table 4, we present similar results for the aggregate agriculture sector. In all cases, the two sector model is employed. The rest of the economy changes size depending on the size of the agriculture sector under consideration.
For each scenario, we consider the impact on four important variables:
welfare ( should not be surprising to those who are familiar with previous estimates of the welfare effects of policy reform in constant returns to scale models without rent capture or rent seeking. Whether in partial or general equilibrium, measuring "Harberger" triangles or its equivalent in general equilibrium models, has typically produced estimates similar to those of tables 3 and 4.1' However, models that estimate the dynamic effects of trade liberalization suggest that the dynamic benefits of trade liberalization are many times the benefits suggested from static models (see e.g., Baldwin, 1989) . These estimates of the dynamic benefits, however, are based on estimates derived from static models such as ours so that our estimates are an important step in the process of estimating the total benefits of trade liberalization.
Comparing the effects of removing export subsidies to removing import licenses reveals that the welfare benefits and sectoral adjustment of output are typically much larger with export subsidy removal. This may appear surprising, especially in the aggregate agriculture case, where the export subsidy and the import license premium are about equal. 1 6 The reason is that separate or piecemeal removal of the import cuotas has important second best effects which reduce the welfaie benefits and output adjustment of the agricultural sector.
We utilize figures 2, 3 and 4 to explain the results of the three policy type scenarios in table 2 and the top of table 3 . These figures each have three ordinary supply-demand diagrams, and are partial equilibrium because they only picture the agricultural sector. Non-etheless, since the linkages within the agriculture sector are incorporated, they are helpful for understanding the principal effects of the policy changes in our general equilibrium model. The domestic product and the imported product are pictured separately since consumers regard the two varieties as heterogeneous (the Armington assumption). Thus, in addition to their own prices, the demand curves for imports and the domestic 'product depend on the price of their substitute. Similarly, for producers, the domestic product and the export product are heterogeneous, and are pictured separately. Since producers can switch markets subject to their technical possibiliti's expressed by the CET function, in addition to its own price, the export (domestic) supply curve is a function of the price of the domestic (export) good. Due to the small country assumption, the supply of imports is perfectly elastic at the world price of imports (WPM) , and the demand for exports is perfectly elastic at the world p:ice of exports (WPE). WPM includes transportation costs but excludes tariffs; the "tariff ridden" demand curve for imports is pictured, since the quota premia rate must be determined residually after the tariff is collected. The export subsie, .te, denoted s, allows producers to obtain WPE(l+s) per unit of exports.
Fiaure 2 illustrates, the effects of removi imnport quota in the presence of an export subsidy in the same industrTn all three figures, variables in the initial equilibrium are denoted by the siLbs,.riot 0; in the new equilibrium by 1. The initial impact of quota removal results in a decline in the price of imports to PM 1 .1 7 Since the demand for the domestic variety depends on the price of imports, the demand for the domestic variety shifts down and its price declines to PD 1 . The lower price of the domestic variety induces two feedback effects: (1) consumers will reoptimize by shifting demand away from imports, i.e., the demand for imports shifts in to dl. Thus, the triangle of benefits measured in the import market is the shaded area shown; 1 " (2) producers will reoptimize by shifting production toward the export variety, which continues to sell at the world price times one plus the export subsidy rate (denoted WPE[l+s]), i.e., the export suppl.y curve shifts out to the right. The government subsicy burden will increase by the size of the shaded rectangle in the export market. This rectanale in the export market is a second best type loss to the " 7 Since our model is a comparative statics model, the 'dynamics' discussed in the context of figures 2, 3 and 4 is for pedagogical purposes only. See Burns (1974) for the justification of the measurement of the benefits of quota removal in the import market as the triangle created by connecting the equilibrium points. economy which must be subtracted from the triangle of benefits in the imDort market to asses overall benefits to the economv;1 9 It follows that the net benefits of quota removal are equal to the shaded triangle in the market for imports minus the shaded rectangle in the market for exports.: 0 It is apparent from figure 2 why the results show very little increase in welfare from a reduction in the import quota alcie in the presence of an export subsidy:
producers substitute in the export market (and obtain increased government subsidies) for reduced demand in the domestic market. Figure 3 illustrates the principal effects of removing an export subsidy on a piecemeal basis in the presence of an import quota on the substitute import variety. The height BC equals the difference between the marginal cost of production of the initial output E. and the price paid by foreigners. If we were to ignore the interaction effects involved in reaching a new equilibrium, the triangle ABC would equal the benefits to the economy of removing the export subsidy; but the interaction effects between the markets reduces the Denefits of export subsidy removal.
Removal of the export subsidy causes the export price of producers to fall to the world price (PE 1 = WPE) . Since the export price to producers falls, producers shift supply to the domestic market, which induces a fall in the price of the domestic variety. The drop in the price of the domestic variety induces a shift down in the demand for imports, which reduces the price of imports. There are further feedback effects as the lower import price induces a downward shift in the demand for domestic goods, whico, in turn induces an increase in the supply
The rectangle of losses to the economy in the export market follows from equation 8 (or its special case equation 5"') in Harberger (1971) . Harberger considers the case where there is a change in the tax (broadly interpreted as any price-cost distortion) on good I (in our case the ,emoval of the import quota) in the presence of taxes on other goods in the economy, say goods 2,...,n. In our case the mcst notable other tax is the export subsidy on exports in the same sector. Then the change in welfare is the change in surplus on euod 1, plus the change in surplus on goods 2,...,n, where the latter is equal to the tax on the other goods times the change in cuantiry of those goods, summed over all such goods.
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There are additional second best effects not shown in figures 2 and 3 including the change in dead-weight losses due to change in demand in the presence of tariffs in agriculrure or the rest of the economy. Most notably, import quota removal results in additional benefits in the agriculture sector equal to the tariff rate times the change in the quantity of imports. Since our approach is general equilibrium, which measures the welfare change by equivalent variation, we consider all second best effects, even though not depicted in the diagram. of exports. Applying the Burns methodology again, the latter effect reduces the benefits of export subsidy reduction to the shaded triangle in the export market." 1 By contrast with figure 2, there are no welfare consequences other than in the market in which the distortion is changing. This follows from the Harberger principal mentioned in the footnote above: since there is no change in the quantity of imports, there is no welfare change in the import market.
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In figure 4 we depict the benefits of removing both the export subsidy and the import quota. Since distortions are removed in both markets, there are triangles of benefits in both the import market and the export market. What may appear puzzling is that despite the triangle of benefits in the import market in figure 4 , in most of the cases in table 3 the welfare benefits of removing export subsidies alone are as large as the combined benefits of removing both export subsidies and import quotas. Comparing figures 3 and 4, one can observe that due to the greater decline in the price of the imported variety in figure 4 , the decline in the price of the domestic good is greater in figure 4 . Then the increase in export supply is greater in figure 4 , which implies that the triangle of benefits in the export market alone is smaller in figure 4 than in figure 3, ceterus 2aribus. These reduced benefits in the export market are typically -pproximately just offset by the triangle of benefits in the import market.
The third column in tables 3 and 4 refers to the net change in tariffs minus subsidy expenditures as a percentage of initial government revenue. Export subsidy reduction improves the Government's fiscal position as expected in all cases--an important consideration given the Government's efforts co control inflation.
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The removal of import licenses provides mixed results on the Government's fiscal position, depending on the elasticities. In table 4, where smaller elasticities of substitution in demand are employed, for reasons explained above, the Government's fiscal position worsens. As shown in figure 2 , the Government will have to increase its expenditures on export subsidies when it removes import licenses. Another effect on government expenditures which is not pictured in figure 2, is that the Government increases its tariff collections as a rasult of the increase in the quantity of imports after the quota is removed. With high import demand elasticities, the increase in imports and the tariff collections are large, and these increased tariff collections exceed the increase in expenditures on export subsidies.
The fourth column in tables 3 and 4 show that the real exchange ra e must depreciate when export subsidies or import licenses are removed. The removal of import licenses increases imports; the removal of export subsidies decreases exports. Thus, the price of traded goods must increase relative to non-traded goods in order to restore equilibrium in the balance of trade, i.e., a real depreciation.
V. COSTS OF A CAP TYPE SYSTEM
As mentioned above, the (overnment initiated a CAP type system in 1991.
Since the amount budgeted was rather modest, the consequences of the program were minimal; thus the real concern is whether the system is a harbinger of a larger program to come. On the one hand, in the Uruguay Round negotiations at the GATT, Hungary is member of the "Cairns" group of nations. Many Government officials recognize that the establishment of a CAP runs counter to the international efforts of the Cairns group in the Uruguay Round (as well as the U.S.) to reduce agricultural subsidies. On the other hand, other officials anticipate that Hungary will eventually join the EC, and believe that they should harmonize their regulatory environment to the EC CAP system which they believe will continue to exist.
The objective of a CAP type system is to support agricultural prices. As mentioned above, due to input-output linkages in the agricultural sector, although the system often starts with feed grains, it quickly spreads to a wide range of products in agriculture. Thus, we shall counterfactually estimate the impact of a price support system in all of agriculture. Moreover, a price support system requires import restraints, since otherwise imports would enter and undermine the price support program. That is, a CAP system would undermine the effort of Hungary to liberalize its trade regime. we simulate a system of price support at three different levels: 5 percent, 10 percent and 20 percent higher than the initial prices.
We assume that the higher prices are achieved by increasing export subsidies and limiting imports to their initial level. That is, we implement the CAP by increasing the export suiasidy to achieve a desired level of domestic prices, holding the import quotas in place, and allowing the quota premium on The estimates would be expected to be lower bound estimates of the costs of the price support system for two reasons. First, the introduction of a CAP 2 "However, an additional rectangle of costs of a CAP, not shown in figure 3 but captured by our model, is the initial subsidy rate times the increase in the quantity of exports. This is analogous to the situation discussed above cf an additional rectangle of benefits due to the presence of an import tariff when the import quota is removed. system increases the demand for imported agricultural products as consumers would like to substitute for the higher priced domestic products. Consumers are prevented from additional importing, however, by the quota restraints. The licensing premium on imports increases from 16.8 percent (table 1) to 26.5 percent. As a consequence, the rents on imported products under license increase.
It would be expected that costly rent-seeking behavior to obtain the more valuable licenzes would also increase. The costs to the economy of this likely increase in rent dissipating activity are an additional cost of the price support system, which are ignor'.d in the estimates of table 4. Second, the government will have to obtain additional revenue (or reduce other expenditures) to compensate for the additional expenditures of the price support system. In practice, additional taxes would impose a dead-weight loss on the economy, but we have employed lump-sum non-distortionary taxes in our model.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have developed a computable general equilibrium model for the purpose of evaluating the consequences of reform of Hungarian agricultural policy. An important empirical step in the exercise was the price comparisons study, the results of which were presented in table 2. These results show that the import licenses were a binding constraint on imports for the products of the table. The results were interpreted through the use of graphs which should facilitate the understanding of models of this type.
The results show that the imposition of a CAP type system would indeed be a costly step backwards for Hungary, especially since the long run trend in Hungarian agricultural policy has been toward less intervention and greater reliance on the market. Import licenses and export subsidies are also shown to be costly inefficient policies. Perhaps the most important policy conclusion is in the area of the piecemeal sequencing of reforms in the presence of both export subsidies and import licenses. The removal of import licenses in the presence of export subsidies will generate byproduct distortions in the export market; little gain in welfare may ensue. On the other hand, the piecemeal removal of export subsidies will not generate byproduct distortions so that su -.&...tial gains can be expected. These greater gains will come, however, at the expense of greater adjustment costs. 
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Demand Ecuations
Equations (2) through (5) represent domestic demand conditions. Equation
(1) is a Stone-Geary utility function in composite goods, TCDi, with parameters XA and i. The parameters Xi are minimal or subsistence expenditures. Thus (TCDi-X,)>O. The parameters 6i (Oi>O and ZO3=1) are related to the own price elasticities of demand. Equation (1) is important in the model only insofar as it forms the basis of the system of demand equations (2) through (6), and for the purpose of calculating the Hicksian equivalent variation. It is not used for the purpose of calculating the equilibrium.
In the first stage, the consumer determines the budgets for the composite consumption goods by maximizing utility subject to the aggregate national income constraint and using appropriately defined average prices for the composite goods. In the second stage, the consumer determines the amounts to consume of the domestic and imported goods (CDi and CMi respectively) that comprise the composite consumption good. This problem can be characterized as solving for the CDi and CMi that maximize composite consumption given prices of the domestic and imported goods, PD, and PMi respectively, and given the budget for the composite good from stage one. This gives equations (4) and (5).
Finally, for consistency between the two stages, the prices for composite goods, PTCDi, in equation (3), are the dual prices obtained from the optimization problem that gives equations (4) and (5).
SupplY Equations
Equations (6) through (11) represent domestic supply conditions. In equation (6), real aggregate output of the economy, XT, is a CET function of composite domestic products XDi. The parameter ptd (ptd>l) is related to the elasticity of transformation, otd, where ptd=1-(1/atd). A graph of equation (6) would show the familiar "bowed-out" production possibility curve for the economy.
I As is well known, it is sufficient for two stage budgeting that the utility function of the representative consumer be weakly separable and that subutility be homothetic. Our specifications satisfy these restrictions.
A-1 Domestic producers allocate resources between sectors so as to maximize the sum of the values of the composite products subject to a fixed level of XT in equation (6). The solution to this optimization problam gives equation (7). The optimal ratio of composite agricultural product to composite domestic product for the rest of the economy, (XDA/XDR) , is directly related to the ratio of prices of the composite products, (PXA/PXR) . Equations (6) and (7) together give the optimal levels of XDA and XDR. Equation (8) gives the price of XT, PXT, which is the dual price of the unit revenue function when composite products are sold optimally.
Each composite domestic product, XD,, is a CET function of the quantity supplied to the domestic market and to foreign markets (exports), where E, and Si are export market and domestic market products respectively. The parameters pti (pt,>1) are related to the elasticities of transformation, at 1 , where pt,=(1-1/at) . Domestic producers find optimal domestic and export supply by maximizing the revenue subject to a given quantity of composite product. This gives equations (9) to (11). The prices of composite domestic products, PXi, are dual prices obtained from the maximization of revenue subject to composite output.
Domestic Prices of Traded Goods
Equations (12) and (13) express the relationships becween domestic prices and world prices of traded goods. The equations all have an exchange rate, ER, that converts world prices to domestic prices. Given our choice of numeraire (see below), the proportional change in ER equals the proportional change in the real exchange rate. Domestic prices of exported products, PEi, are based on world prices, PWEi, and increased by the factor (l+TEi) when there are export subsidies. The export subsidy rate is 100*TEi percent. Domestic prices of imported products, PMi, are based on world prices, PWMi, and increased by the factor (1+TMi) when there are tariffs on imports. The import tariff rate is 100*TMi percent. If there are effective quantitative restraints on imports due to import licensing, then the domestic price of imports is higher than the price that would result if the only restriction on imports were a tariff. The additional effect on prices due to licensing is indicated by the factor (1+PRCO9). The tariff equivalent rate for import licensing is 100*PRCOi percent.
Eo-uilibrium for Domestic Goods
It is assumed that equilibrium in the markets for domestic goods can be characterized by setting demand equal to supply. This gives equation (14).
Tariffs, Subsidies. Government Revenue, Import Premiums Equation (15) is the revenue collected by the government from tariffs on imports and equation (16) is the government outlay for subsidies on exports. The net effect on the government budget of tariff revenues and export subsidies is indicated by equation (17). All other government revenues and outlays are outside the scope of the model and assumed to be constant lump sum collections and disbursements.
Effective quantitative restraints due to import licensing create a scarcity value or premium for import licenses. The total value of import premiums for each imported product is given by equation (18).
A-2
Trade Balance, National Income and Expenditure. Numeraire Equation (19) states that the country's balance of payments on trade account with the rest of the world, in world prices, is constant. This equation embodies the assumption that the country faces a budget constraint with the rest of the world and cannot, by changing its own trade policies, influence its preexisting trade balance.
Equation (20) gives the relationship between national income and expenditure. It is readily shown that consumers spend all their income on the two composite goods. The sum of TCD,, equation (2), which is total expenditure on composite goods, equals GDP. The TCDi are CES functions of CDi and CMI, and CES functions are linear homogeneous. Therefore the sum of consumer expenditures on CD, and CM, also equals GDP. This demonstrates that Walras Law holds.
The terms on the rhs of equation (20) are total income of the economy, and explained as follows. The first term on the rhs of (20) is payments by domestic producers to factors of production (e.g., suppliers of labor and capital). This follows from the fact that the CET function in equation (6) is linear homogeneous plus the assumption that payments to productive factors exhaust total receipts by producers in each sector. The o.'Aer terms on the rhs relate to trade policies and the balance of payments. (rhese terms would be zero absent tariffs, export subsidies, import licensing, and a deficit or surplus in the current account.) The second term adds tariff revenue less export subsidies; the third term adds total import licensing premiums; the fourth term is the adjustment to the economy's income from the trade balance.
Finally, the price variables must be normalized in some manner. CGE models typically do not have money so that absolute price levels have no meaning: only relative prices matter. In this model prices are normalized by equation (21). As explained by Tarr (1989) , this normalization procedure has the advantage that the percent change in the nominal exchange rate equals the percent change in the real exchange rate (i.e., percent change in the relative price of traded goods to nontraded (domestic) goods. Table A .2 lists all the variables and parameters in the model. There are 31 endogenous variables and equations (recall equation (1) is not employed in the model). Due to Walras' Law, however, one of the equations is redundant, which allows us to drop an equation or add a variable. The model has seven exogenous variables. The values of these variables are fixed at 1990 levels. Most notably, the exogenous variables include the real aggregate output of the economy, XT, and the trade balance, TRB.
II. Model Variables and Parameters
The major policy parameters are: the ad valorem export subsidy rate for an agricultural product, TEA, the ad valorem import tariff rate for an agricultural product, TMA, and the ad valorem Lpremium rate attributable to import licensing for an agricultural product, PRMCOA. The values of the policy parameters for 1990 are given in the text, in table 1. The derivation of the licensing premia is explained in table 2 of the text.
Finally, the mnodel has 12 parameters that are obtained when the model is benchmarked to our 1990 data set. For a discussion and illustration of benchmarking and the calibration of parameters in a .GE model, see de Melo and Tarr (1992) .
A-3 Data for Elasticity Parameters
The model has four types of elasticity parameters specified in table A.3. In any simulation, seven elasiticity values must be specified: three in the agriculture sector, three in the rest of the economy and one shared elasticity of transformation between the agriculture sector and the rest of the economy.
Data for Production, Exports. and Imoorts These data were obtained from official Hungarian sources with the assistance of Ms. Agnes Nagy, Kopint-Datorg, Budapest. In some instances, it was necessary to form estirnates based on consultation with experts in Hungary. Harrison, Rutherford, and Tarr (1993) Morkre (1990), p. 18-22
